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Abstract 
School restructuring raises questions about the role of school districts in
improving student learning. Centralization by state governments and
decentralization to individual schools as proposed in systemic reform
leave districts' role unsettled. Empirical research on the district role in
the context of ongoing reform is inadequate. This analysis of combined
data from the NAEP and the Common Core of Data (CCD) was intended
to address the issue. We analyzed 1990, 1992, and 1996 NAEP 8th grade
mathematics national assessment data in combination with CCD data of
2 of 39
corresponding years to examine the extent to which student achievement
was related to districts' control over instructional expenditure, adjusting
for relevant key factors at both district and student levels. Upon sample
modification, we used hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to estimate
the relationships of student achievement to two district fiscal policy
indictors, current expenditure per pupil (CEPP) and districts'
discretionary rates for instructional expenditure (DDR). Net of relevant
district factors, DDR was found unrelated to districts' average 8th grade
math performance. The null effect was consistent in the analysis of the
combined NAEP-CCD data for 1990, 1992, and 1996. In contrast, CEPP
was found related to higher math performance in a modest yet fairly
consistent way. Future research may be productive to separately study
individual states and integrate the findings onto the national level.
  
The role of the local school district is problematic in the on-going school restructuring that focuses
on student learning. Centralization by state governments and decentralization to individual schools
as proposed in systemic reform leaves districts' role unsettled (Elmore 1993). Research is needed to
examine the impact of district policymaking on student learning. Such research entails linking
standardized achievement measures at the student level to district-level policy information
comparable across jurisdictions.
This study explored policy and methodological issues relevant to these concerns. We analyzed
NAEP data in combination with the Common Core of Data (CCD) to examine the extent to which
student achievement was related to districts' control over expenditure, adjusting for relevant key
factors at both district and student levels.
Research Background
Education reformers face a dilemma in trying to redefine the local school district role in relation to
state government. On the one hand, the local district, as an independent political entity for local
control of public schools, is supposed to buffer the schools against external political influences. On
the other hand, as a legal creation of the state, the district is expected to work as an instrument of
state government and to implement state policies and regulations with minimal change. The notion
of simultaneous decentralization and centralization gives states and individual schools more
policymaking authority, but leaves the local districts in an ambiguous position (Hannaway 1992;
Clune 1993; Keedy 1994; Marsh 1997). As the authority and responsibility of the state
governments continue to expand in public education, districts' role as a governmental unit seems to
be diminishing (e.g., see Walberg & Walberg 1994; Elmore 1993).
State governments are playing an increasingly important role in fiscal control and prescriptive
policymaking in a wide range of areas that were historically the domains of local district
decisionmaking. States are contributing a large and growing share to local school revenue,
specifying requirements on staffing and instruction (General Accounting Office 1998). State aid
formulas have often incorporated specific mechanisms for district inefficiency control, linking
spending to performance (Duncombe & Yinger 1998; Marsh 1997). Frequently, state governments
threaten to and occasionally do take over local schools when persistent failure by local
administration is confirmed (e.g., Iannaccone & Lutz 1994; Guskey 1993).
The districts' power is also threatened by decentralization in forms of site-based management and
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the school as a professional community (Marsh 1997; Elmore 1993; Clune 1993; Porter 1994;
Newmann & Wahlage 1995). State education departments now often select individual schools as
administrative units for deregulation and interact directly with them to encourage local initiatives
(Fuhrman & Elmore 1995). Local schools are expanding their options in mobilizing community
support, making innovations in instruction and curriculum, and making decisions on spending and
staffing (Elmore 1993; Hannaway 1993). Research appears to support such restructuring as recent
studies focus on school-level professional autonomy and its link to authentic instruction and
achievement outcomes (e.g., Lee, Smith & Croninger 1995; Newmann & Wahlage 1995). One
implication is that decentralization is reducing bureaucratic influence—including district
influence—in local school decisionmaking.
The 16,000 local districts in the U.S. are, however, more than a historical heritage. National data
reports describe local districts as solid administrative units with diverse conditions (e.g., Levine &
Christenson 1998; Protheroe 1997). The question for reformers is how to adjust the system to the
changing environment, since the underlying logic of American federalism requires multiple
jurisdictions that compromise different interests and generate productive tension and dependence
among jurisdictions (Elmore 1993). Available research suggests that it is possible for local districts
to push reform further by building up strong local constituencies and developing policy initiatives
(Fuhrman & Elmore 1990; Admundson 1993). This research, however, has been conducted largely
with local or state information sources and has rarely used national data. To conduct research at
national scale requires nationwide data on both student achievement and local fiscal conditions.
Synthetic analysis of the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) and the Common
Core of Data (CCD), explored in this study, seems an efficient approach to this goal.
Conceptual Framework
Our basic assumption is that although state governments are constitutionally responsible for public
education, local districts have an important role in improving instruction. An approach districts take
in playing that role is to adjust fiscal policy to increase the proportion of expenditure for instruction
above the state average.
Instructional expenditure as a district policy
School districts differ in instructional expenditure. A recent study used the Bureau of the Census
Annual Survey of Local Government data from 1980 to 1994 to calculate multiple indicators of
cross-district disparity in instructional expenditure (Hussar & Sonnenburg 1999). This study found
that while disparity in instructional expenditures across districts seemed to decline in many states,
disparity measures and the pattern of decline varied substantially. Furthermore, in a fairly large
number of states, the disparity measures were inconsistent, and, in a small number of states,
disparity increased over the same period of time. While these disparity measures may imply
inequity they also reflect local fiscal policy differences because instructional expenditures, relative
to current expenditures, are more subject to government control (Hussar & Sonnenburg 1999).
Research is unsettled about the relationship between school expenditure and student achievement
(for reviews and debates, see Conn 1995; Lockwood 1994; Hanushek 1994, 1996; Hedges &
Greenwald 1996; Hough 1993). An emerging consensus, however, is that overall funding and
per-pupil expenditure may be overly simplistic as a predictor of learning outcomes, since schooling
is conditioned by complicated factors of administration, family, and community (e.g., Wainer 1993;
Hough 1993). While recent research has provided some evidence supporting the view that
increased funding relates to better performance (e.g., Payne & Biddle 1999; Wenglinsky 1997),
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whether overall revenue or average per-pupil expenditure substantially affects academic outcomes
remains controversial (e.g., Hanushek 1996; Hedges & Greenwald 1996). Research needs to relate
performance outcomes to variations in resource allocation in general and teaching resources
devoted to specific program areas in particular (Brent, Roellke & Monk 1997; Monk & Hussain
2000). How the money is spent may be crucial to improving achievement (Childs & Shakeshaft
1986; Conn 1995). Research examining the impact of public school spending, particularly spending
for disadvantaged schools, suggests that learning can be improved if investment targets improving
teacher quality (e.g., Kazal-Thresher 1993; Ferguson 1991), core curriculum, and standardized
achievement (e.g., Lockwood 1994).
Policy analyses in systemic reform highlight the importance of fiscal control as an
incentive/sanction mechanism directly linking to academic performance (Lockwood 1994; Elmore
1994). Under this mechanism, schools and teachers are encouraged to develop pedagogical
initiatives for reaching high-standard curricular goals and are held accountable for improving
student performance. In this line of thinking, the amount of money spent directly on improving
instruction/learning relative to the amount spent on administrative operations and support services
should be a crucial determinant of achievement outcomes (Childs & Shakeshaft 1986; Elmore
1993). On the other hand, current expenditure per pupil (CEPP), which covers spending on broad
and immediate local needs, to some extent indicates local initiatives and priorities in fiscal control.
Encompassing obligatory capital outlay and district discretionary spending, CEPP may also be a
valid predictor of student achievement.
In this study, we ask how districts change state prescribed patterns of expenditure and how such
changes relate to academic achievement. The departure of a district's proportional spending on
instruction from the state baseline proportion may imply local autonomy in fiscal policy, which has
been advocated as a fundamental mechanism for maintaining local stake and accountability
(Murphy 1994; Strang 1987). Conceptualizing fiscal control as an essential element of local
autonomy, we attempted to pinpoint a key issue in redefining the district role. We hypothesized
that, other conditions being equal, a higher district instructional spending rate relative to the state
average is associated with higher district average math achievement. In addition, we also examined
CEPP, a more generic indicator of local financial control, by assessing its relationship to student
performance.
Factors related to district spending
Communities are often constrained from spending more on instruction by local conditions. For
example, poor communities have to spend more on basic social services, and sparsely populated
areas must pay more for transportation. A large state contribution to district revenue probably
constrains local discretion. The larger the share of the state contribution, the more likely the
recipient districts fund instruction at a level close to the state baseline. Local cost of living is
another factor that needs to be considered when examining school resources as it obviously affects
the spending for teacher hiring and instruction.
The power of districts varies depending on local socioeconomic conditions, enrollment size, and
geographic locale. Local socioeconomic conditions as a determinant of local autonomy may alter
the intended consequence of district policy. Wealthy districts with their well educated populations
and organized political support may push reform farther and benefit more from focusing on
instruction and learning (Elmore 1993). In contrast, poor districts with populations of low
education and income but high mobility often cannot come up with powerful political support for
reform. Increasing spending on instruction may compromise desperately needed social services and
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ultimately undermine student learning. The influence of district policy probably also varies across
urban-rural areas. Traditionally, rural residents are demographically homogeneous within
communities but diverse across communities (Nachtigal 1982), have strong ties to local schools,
and are skeptical about external governance (DeYoung 1990). Within different sociodemographic
contexts, districts' investment in instruction may result in quite different achievement outcomes.
Prior studies have explored school funding in connection to standard achievement by synthetic
analyses of data from CCD and NAEP (Wenglinsky 1997, 1998) or international standardized tests
(Payne & Biddle 1999). In particular, Wenglinsky (1997) aggregated achievement measures to the
district level and used both school-level and district-level variables to predict achievement. Taking
the district as the unit of analysis, single-level analyses of aggregated performance show that
average performance is positively associated with school resources. While such aggregated studies
deal with the broad issues linking school resources to performance, they were not meant to and did
not address specific questions concerning district fiscal policy in relation to individual student
achievement. Furthermore, there are methodological problems in converting NAPE's multi-level
stratified sample design into a single-level district sample design. The district sample resulting from
attaching aggregated NAEP performance data to CCD district records does not necessarily
represent the national population of school districts.
In a second study, Wenglinsky used a hierarchical linear model (HLM) technique to analyze
merged 1992 NAEP and CCD data on 12th grade mathematics (Wenglinsky 1998). Again, this
analysis did not focus on district fiscal control. It addressed the broad concern of school resources
in connection to social distribution of academic achievement. Further, the study did not distinguish
district and school spending measures in the analysis. It did not deal with the methodological
difficulty stemming from the data merge, namely, the possible unreliability of the estimates
resulting from the merged data. (Note 1) Our study was designed to continue this line of research
by synthesizing national data on student achievement and district spending, using sampling
adjustment procedures and the technique of two-level hierarchical linear modeling.
Research questions
The first question in our study was whether or not student achievement varies across districts. The
answer to this question sets the basis for addressing the substantive concern of district-level effect
and for statistical testing of two-level models. The second question was how student achievement
relates to district instructional spending—and CEPP. As the central issue in this analysis, we asked
how district mean achievement related to district fiscal policy, adjusting for other variables at the
district level and sociodemographics at the student level. District fiscal policy was indicated by two
variables, CEPP and District Discretionary Rate of instructional spending. The latter was simply the
difference of the district instructional spending rate from the state instructional spending rate.
Compatible to the concept underlying such disparity measures as the coefficient of variation and the
Gini coefficient (see Hussar & Sonnenberg 1999), DDR should make it straightforward to interpret
the HLM estimates of the district fiscal policy effect.
The third question was: to what extent did DDR and CEPP, together with other district factors,
account for the achievement outcome variance after adjusting for relevant district-level factors
(e.g., enrollment size, state contributed share to district revenue, minority rate, poverty rate,
geographic locale). In addition, we examined the possible interaction effects of DDR with three
district conditions: the proportion of district revenue that came from the state, the average
socioeconomic status (SES), and urban-rural locale. This would allow us to ask whether DDR had
different effects on achievement under different conditions.
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A final question about the achievement gaps: did higher district instructional spending help reduce
math achievement gaps associated with race and SES? In other words, did increased instruction
spending above the state average not only work to promote academic excellence, but also equity?
Data Sources and Methodology
For this study, we combined data from NAEP 1990, 1992, and 1996 National Comparison Grade 8
Files and the Common Core of Data (CCD) in school years 1989—90, 1991—92, and 1995—96.
As the most comprehensive and reliable national data source on academic achievement, the NAEP
math tests in these three years shared a framework supported by the National Council of Teachers
of Mathematics (Reese, Miller, Mazzeo & Dossey 1997).
CCD, covering the universe of U.S. public school districts, provides district-level itemized
revenue/expenditures on an annual basis (National Center for Education Statistics 1995). It also
contains a state file that gives spending data at the state level, which can be used to compute DDR.
CCD offers information for examining district fiscal policies, including core expenditures per
pupil, current expenditures per pupil, total expenditures per pupil, percent of total instruction
expenditures, and percent of total salary expenditures, as well as related state spending measures.
Additionally information on local sociodemographic conditions is available, including extensive
1990 Census data that were incorporated into district records. A linkage file is available for linking
NAEP national and state assessments files with CCD data for the years between 1990 and 1998
(Westat 1998).
File Merge
First, we extracted data from the 1990, 1992, and 1996 NAEP National Comparison of math in 8th
grade and CCD district files for school years 1989—90, 1991—92, and 1995—96. Using district
identification code in both the NAEP and CCD files, we merged the two datasets for these years.
With assistance from Westat and ETS, the three years' data were matched reasonably well. Most
districts contained adequate numbers of students for two-level analysis (see Table 1).
Table 1
Sample size at district and within-district levels:
Combined NAEP-CCD data (1990, 1992, and 1996, unweighted)
Year
District 
sample 
size
Mean 
within-district 
student sample 
size
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum
1990 144 43.2 23.2 12.0 157.0
1992 177 45.2 27.1 21.0 185.0
1996 160 34.9 18.6 10.0 113.0
1
 For the 1990 data one district (LEAID 3701530) had two cases and was excluded from the
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analysis.
2
 For the 1992 data two districts (with LEAIDs 5304920 and 1713970) had fewer than three cases
and were excluded from the HLM analysis.
The resulting files contain NAEP 8th grader records, with affiliated district variables attached.
Additionally, district-level cross-product terms were constructed to represent the interaction effects
of DDR and the child poverty rate, DDR and urban locale, and DDR and the percentage of district
revenue from the state (see Tables 2.1—2.3 for unweighted descriptive statistics at the two levels).
Table 2-1
Descriptive statistics at student- and district-levels: 1996 NAEP-CCD data
Student Level 1
Variable 
name Variable label N Mean SD Minimum Maximum
DSEX Student sex 5,590 1.50 0.50 1.00 2.00
MRPCM1 Plausible value 1 5,590 268.97 36.46 127.98 388.50
MRPCM2 Plausible value 2 5,590 269.17 36.03 120.35 393.46
MRPCM3 Plausible value 3 5,590 268.87 36.52 124.06 384.47
MRPCM4 Plausible value 4 5,590 268.89 36.01 138.54 378.93
MRPCM5 Plausible value 5 5,590 269.14 35.87 121.28 381.77
MINORITY Non-Asian minorities 5,590 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
PARHI_ED Parent education 5,590 0.58 0.49 0.00 1.00
District level 2
ASIER Average state instruction 
expenditure rate 160 60.99 6.48 50.08 77.85
DDR District Discretionary instruction 
spending Rate 160 -0.24 6.78 -24.99 17.35
URBAN2 Urban district 160 0.27 0.43 0.00 1.00
RURAL Rural district 160 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
ENROLL_K District total enrollment in thousand 160 41.84 110.32 0.14 1,049.04
BLACK_P Black student rate 160 19.00 24.75 0.00 99.00
P7118TP District poverty rate 160 17.01 11.19 0.00 58.50
PC30ETP District at-risk student rate 160 3.68 3.40 0.00 15.80
C_STREVP District revenue percentage from 
state 160 47.61 18.96 1.80 78.90
CURPPE_K Current per pupil expenditure in $K 160 5.36 1.43 3.38 11.27
LEV2WT District weight 160 1.00 1.37 0.06 10.29
DDR_RUL Interaction DDR by rural 160 -1.11 4.18 -24.99 6.35
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DDR_URB Interaction DDR by urban 160 0.40 2.94 -18.96 13.44
DDR_STP Interaction DDR by revenue 
percentage from state 160 -27.66 355.46 -1404.46 921.62
DDR_SES Interaction DDR by poverty rate 160 -20.10 153.74 -753.19 529.19
DDR_RSK Interaction DDR by at-risk student 
rate 160 -2.16 35.07 -189.98 112.78
Table 2-2
Descriptive statistics of at student- and district-levels: 1992 NAEP-CCD data
Student level 1
Variable 
name Variable label N Mean SD Minimum Maximum
DSEX Student sex 8,014 1.48 0.50 1.00 2.00
MRPCM1 Plausible value 1 8,014 258.94 37.53 130.75 372.33
MRPCM2 Plausible value 2 8,014 259.07 37.93 127.82 380.17
MRPCM3 Plausible value 3 8,014 259.29 37.91 110.48 389.45
MRPCM4 Plausible value 4 8,014 259.33 37.65 126.88 380.38
MRPCM5 Plausible value 5 8,014 259.30 37.74 123.39 389.55
MINORITY Non-Asian minorities 8,014 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
PARHI_ED Parent education 8,014 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00
District level 2
ASIER Average state instruction 
expenditure rate 177 60.73 6.69 50.08 77.85
DDR District Discretionary instruction 
spending Rate 177 0.31 5.20 -13.54 16.26
URBAN2 Urban district 177 0.30 0.45 0.00 1.00
RURAL Rural district 177 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00
ENROLL_K District total enrollment in 
thousand 177 43.93 98.04 0.17 962.27
BLACK_P Black student rate 177 15.82 24.58 0.00 99.00
P7118TP District poverty rate 177 15.94 11.57 0.30 68.70
PC30ETP District at-risk student rate 177 4.03 4.09 0.00 23.60
C_STREVP District revenue percentage from 
state 177 42.40 20.98 0.00 84.60
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CURPPE_K Current per pupil expenditure in 
$K 177 4.92 1.34 2.98 10.07
LEV2WT District weight 177 1.00 1.27 0.06 8.55
DDR_RUL Interaction DDR by rural 177 -0.59 2.40 -13.54 6.42
DDR_URB Interaction DDR by urban 177 0.38 2.59 -11.16 16.26
DDR_STP Interaction DDR by revenue 
percentage from state 177 5.36 266.05 -1063.18 757.29
DDR_SES Interaction DDR by poverty rate 177 -3.26 100.04 -472.35 306.73
DDR_RSK Interaction DDR by at-risk student 
rate 177 -0.05 27.16 -162.26 98.59
Table 2-3
Descriptive statistics at student- and district-levels: 1990 NAEP-CCD data
Student level 1
Variable 
name Variable label N Mean SD Minimum Maximum
DSEX Student sex 6,213 1.48 0.50 1.00 2.00
MRPCM1 Plausible value 1 6,213 256.24 33.43 149.28 370.23
MRPCM2 Plausible value 2 6,213 256.28 33.21 138.77 375.86
MRPCM3 Plausible value 3 6,213 256.61 33.11 159.70 367.46
MRPCM4 Plausible value 4 6,213 256.14 33.44 139.74 377.80
MRPCM5 Plausible value 5 6,213 256.32 33.17 145.25 352.46
MINORITY Non-Asian minorities 6,213 0.32 0.47 0.00 1.00
PARHI_ED Parent education 6,213 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00
District Level 2
ASIER Average state instruction 
expenditure rate 143 59.61 5.71 49.16 76.82
DDR District Discretionary instruction 
spending Rate 143 0.19 7.59 -20.70 22.36
URBAN2 Urban district 143 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
RURAL Rural district 143 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00
ENROLL_K District total enrollment in 
thousand 143 37.28 103.39 0.09 918.01
BLACK_P Black student rate 143 14.92 20.48 0.00 93.00
P7118TP District poverty rate 143 19.55 12.35 1.00 60.40
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PC30ETP District at-risk student rate 143 4.50 4.55 0.00 25.30
C_STREVP District revenue percentage from 
state 143 48.43 18.39 1.60 82.40
CURPPE_K Current per pupil expenditure in 
$K 143 4.31 1.15 2.41 8.69
LEV2WT District weight 143 0.99 1.71 0.01 8.44
DDR_RUL Interaction DDR by rural 143 -1.17 4.42 -20.70 9.21
DDR_URB Interaction DDR by urban 143 0.85 3.10 -7.24 15.37
DDR_STP Interaction DDR by revenue 
percentage from state 143 10.84 392.55 -1,340.28 1,551.92
DDR_SES Interaction DDR by poverty rate 143 2.70 169.59 -494.14 673.09
DDR_RSK Interaction DDR by at-risk student 
rate 143 3.01 40.59 -142.15 153.75
Sample Modification and Overall Weight
The resulting student subsamples within districts might not have been reliable in presenting the
student populations of the given districts, because schools, not districts, were a sampling stage in
the original NAEP design. Therefore, we reweighted and poststratified the data to improve its
statistical reliability. The purpose was to shift the sampling stage from the school to the district in
order to examine differences across groups of students who were hypothetically influenced by local
districts' instructional.
The modification of the NAEP school-student sample into a district-student sample entailed
reweighting the original sample and establishing the formal statistical status of the district-student
sample. Within a sampled PSU, the NAEP school sample via "post-allocation" induced a district
sample that included districts with which the sample schools were affiliated. With modification the
representativeness of the school sample to PSUs would lead to the representativeness of the district
sample to PSUs. The procedure is highlighted below; see Appendix I for details.
Student sample weighting
We assigned weights to each sample district within a PSU according to the district's post-inclusion
probability, which was defined as the inclusion probability of the union of sample schools in the
district. The calculation of this probability is described in Appendix I. The post-inclusion
probabilities were used as a reference scale for assigning the district weights. The weight assigned
to a sample district was proportionate to the reciprocal of its post-inclusion probability.
The students within a district were weighted by the reciprocal of the student sampling rate within
the district. To calculate the weight we used the student population size of the sample district at a
given grade. The CCD school file provided student enrollment size for each grade of the school,
which was aggregated to the district level. We made a ratio adjustment (Deville & Sarndal 1992;
Deville, Sarndal & Sautory 1993; Little 1993) of the student weights within the districts via
poststratification according to important geographic/demographic features. We used this procedure
to improve the representativeness of the student samples within districts to the district student
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populations.
The PSU weights remained intact. The obtained student weights were further adjusted at the
national level in the same way as the poststratification conducted for the 1992 NAEP (see Wallace
& Rust 1994, section 5.1.4). The resulting student sample preserved the goal of the original NAEP
sampling design; namely, the targeted number of students at the given grades for the assessment
were selected at a uniform probability nationwide (Wallace and Rust 1994, chapter 2).
District sample weighting 
Multilevel linear modeling requires the use of level-2 unit (district) weights in analysis to assure
that the level-2 sample represents the specified population (Bryk & Raudenbush 1992). We
weighted the district sample to make it represent the national district population using the national
district population information from CCD. To improve the representativeness of the district sample
calibration (ratio adjustment), poststratification was carried out along race and Census region.
These demographic and geographic characteristics were selected after a comparison of the sample
and population distributions of those characteristics (Deville, Sarndal & Sautory 1993; Little 1993)
(see Appendix II for the modified sampling distribution of race and Census region).
Analytical Approach
Before data analysis, we edited the data, examined missing data patterns, and constructed indicators
to represent concepts to be analyzed (see Tables 2.1—2.3 for descriptive statistics of the variables
at the student- and district levels).
Expenditure measures
District instructional spending measures and other fiscal variables were made comparable across
locations by adjusting for local cost of living and inflation. We used the Teacher Cost Index (TCI)
for states and districts available from NCES for the adjustment (National Center for Education
Statistics 1995; also see Fowler & Monk 2001). TCI, an index of costs for hiring teachers, was
developed through a regression analysis that estimated the effects of multiple factors, including the
cost of living and quality of life for each state and district. The TCI score for states were centered
by the national average of 100 (National Center for Education Statistics 1995).
We multiplied each state's total capital outlay per pupil by the TCI score for the given state and
each district's by the district's TCI. Instructional expenditure rates at both district and state were
calculated by dividing instructional expenditure per pupil with the adjusted total capital outlay per
pupil. The resulting district rate was centered around the given state rate to generate the DDR in
instructional expenditure. This TCI adjustment did not change the values of DDRs within a state,
but it adjusted the difference in DDR for districts in different states.
Rescaling data
We recoded student race/ethnicity into a binary variable (White/Asian vs. minorities) and parent's
education into two binary variables (with some postsecondary education vs. without). All per-pupil
total expenditure measures were rescaled in thousands of dollars, total expenditure in millions of
dollars, and total enrollment in thousands of students. In HLM modeling, each of the district-level
variables was further centered around the grand mean, whereas each student variable was centered
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around the district mean.
Missing data
We examined nonresponse patterns to assure there were no systematic missing data to bias
statistics. Approximately 12 percent of the 1992 NAEP student records and 3 percent of the 1996
records had missing data on one or more district variables due to unmatched records. There were no
such missing data for 1990. We flagged the cases that had no district fiscal data in each file with a
single missing indicator. One indicator was sufficient because missing data occurred quite
consistently for most of the district fiscal measures. We then imputed data with grand mean on each
missing variable and examined the missingness in a series of single-level regular regression
analyses that included all the predictor variables of math achievement (for rationale see Cohen &
Huang 2000; Little & Rubin 1986). We found that the missing data were largely random as the
regression coefficient for the missing flag was not statistically significant in the three years. Thus,
in the HLM analysis, we simply used the mean-imputed values for the missing data without using
the missing flag.
Two-level hierarchical modeling
After reweighting the samples, we conducted univariate and bivariate analyses to examine data
quality. Single-level multiple regression analyses were run with conceptually important variables to
explore the general pattern of relationships between district variables and math achievement. We
also examined the data to make sure that no obvious anomalies existed.
The central research question was whether student achievement was related to district discretionary
rates in instructional spending (DDR). To address this question with data for each specified year,
the two-level modeling took the math composite plausible values as the independent variables and
DDRs as the predictor variables controlling for district- and student-level variables. See appendix
III for a formal discussion of the HLM procedure. We used software package HLM Windows 5.03,
which has a component to run the repeated procedure with multiple plausible values and to average
the estimated coefficients (see Bryk, Raudenbush & Congdon 1996).
We conducted the two-level analysis in four steps. First, we examine the extent to which
achievement varied across districts and the proportion of variability attributed to student effects and
to district effects. With a one-way random effects ANOVA model, we separated the total variance of 
math achievement into between- and within-district components. By assessing the intraclass
correlation and reliability of district means, we determined that district-level variance was
substantial and statistically significant for further modeling.
Second, we estimated the relationships of a district's average math score to DDR and CEPP,
adjusting for the effects of total enrollment size, minority student rate, poverty rate, state
contribution to the district revenue, and geographic locale. With a random-interception model, we 
examined the extent to which district average achievement related to DDR and CEPP, controlling
for the district-level variables specified above.
Next, we explored the interaction effects between DDR and district factors that might have
potential combined effect on achievement. We asked of the DDR effect on achievement
differentiated by some district characteristics. For example, DDR was probably more influential to
achievement in disadvantaged districts; or, DDR might affect achievement in districts that relied
more on local revenue than on state contributions. We specifically estimated the effect of the
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cross-product terms of DDR and poverty, DDR and rural-urban locale, and DDR and the state share
in district's revenue.
Finally, we tested three important student-level variables—sex, SES, and minority status—in a
random coefficient regression model. We assess the extent to which these three individual effects
varied between districts. Given that these gaps did vary across districts, we then tested full models
that included these student variables. The full model accounted for both district average
achievement and district achievement gaps. We first determine whether DDR related to district
average math score, adjusting for both district- and student-level variables. Then, we asked whether
achievement gaps due to sociodemographic backgrounds related to DDR (or, whether DDR helped
reduce math achievement gaps).
Including student variables in the model was also methodologically important. Students were not
randomly associated with districts; the district-level estimates might be biased if we did not control
for student background effects. Second, sex, SES, and minority status at student level were
established background factors that strongly related to achievement. Controlling for these variables
could reduce unexplained level-1 error and thus improve the precision of the estimates of district
spending rates as well as the power of hypothesis tests (Bryk & Raudenbush 1992).
Problems and limitations
It is typically more difficult to model slopes than means with HLM techniques. Prior analyses of the
NAEP data have reported unreliable estimation with slope equations (for example, Arnold 1995).
While concentrated in intercept models, we did test slope models with limited number of variables
at the two levels. The resulting slope estimates were considerably less reliable than those of
intercept models.
Findings
Data across the three years appeared reasonably compatible in univariate statistics. At the student
level, sex (with male coded 1 female coded 2) and minority (with the Asian and White coded zero,
all the other groups coded 1) distributions were quite steady with data of the three years. Parents'
educational levels seemed slightly rising. The rate of sample students whose parents had at least
some college education was 52 percent in 1990, 54 percent in 1992, and 58 percent in 1996. The
NAEP math achievement on average was higher in 1996 than in the other two years (approximately
268 in 1996, 259 in 1992, and 256 in 1990) with compatible standard deviations and ranges (see
Tables 2-1 to 2-3).
At the district level, the descriptive statistics were reasonably compatible across years as well. The
average state instructional spending rate (ASIER) barely differed over the years, ranging from 59.61
to 60.99 percent. DDR averaged very close to zero because by definition the scores were centered
by the state average. This measure's standard deviation was similar across years though the range
shifted slightly. CEPP on average rose from $4,310 in 1990 to $5,360 in 1996. The average
proportion of district revenue that came from the state (C_STREVP) also seemed acceptable, with
estimates ranging from 42.40 percent in 1992 to 48.43 percent in 1990. These sample estimates
from the NAEP-CCD combined data were quite consistent with the released national statistics (e.g.,
National Center for Education Statistics 1996). Likewise, district level demographic statistics (total
enrollment, Black student rate, poverty rate, and at-risk student rate) appeared reasonable for the
three years. Tables 2.1—2.3 also present descriptive statistics for the interaction terms between
DDR and district demographic variables.
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A possible anomaly was with the geographic locale. While the rate of urban districts ranged 26 to
30 percent for the years—again reasonable estimates—the rate of rural districts shifted somewhat
excessively from 15 percent in 1996 to 37 percent in 1990. This problem could be indicative of the
unreliability of the merged NAEP and CCD data.
Bivariate Statistics
A number of patterns revealed in the bivariate correlation analysis must be noted. First, fiscal
measures at district level were correlated, often in large magnitude. The total expenditure and
current expenditure, for example, had a correlation coefficient around 0.98 in all three years (the
full matrix of the correlation coefficients is available upon request to the first author). Per pupil
spending items (for example, CEPP, per pupil total expenditure, and per pupil instruction
expenditure) were correlated to each other. These measures were substantially correlated with the
total expenditure measures, albeit to a moderate extent. Expenditure measures were also closely
related to enrollment size. Table 3 shows the estimates of bivariate correlation among the selected
district-level variables.
Note that even in this selected group, there were pairs of variables that were well correlated.
Proportion of district revenue from the state was strongly associated with CEPP (0.68 in 1996, 0.70
in 1992, and 0.66 in 1990). Poverty rate and at-risk student rate were also strongly related (0.62,
0.75, and 0.40, respectively, for the three years). We excluded at-risk student rate from the equation
because it presumably overlapped with poverty rate to indicate the disadvantaged condition of a
district, yet its range was smaller than the poverty rate. For similar reasons, we dropped rural locale
and retained urban locale to make the model parsimonious. (Note 2)
The high multicollinearity required model specification with high selectivity of independent
variables at the district level such that the included variables were not highly correlated to each
other and adequately represented our conceptual model. After testing OLS regression analyses with
SAS and an initial run of two-level models with HLM, we decided to specify in the final model the
following independent variables at the district level:
District discretionary rate in instructional spending,
State average instructional spending rate,
CEPP (in thousands of dollars),
Proportion of revenue from the state,
Total enrollment (in thousands of students),
Black student enrollment rate,
Child poverty rate, and
Urban locale (in contrast with suburban).
Table 3
Correlation coefficients of the selected district level variables: NEAP-CCD
district level data 1996 1992 and 1990 (weighted with district weight)
1996 (N=160)
State average
instruction
spending rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
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DDS (1) *-0.19
Total enrollment (thousand) (2) -0.05 *0.26
Black student rate (3) *-0.30 0.03 0.15
Current expenditure per pupil in $k (4) *0.68 -0.12 -0.03 -0.15
Poverty rate (5) *-0.28 *-0.22 0.00 0.15 -0.11
At-risk student rate (6) *-0.34 0.02 0.05 *0.28 -0.14 *0.62
Percent of revenue from state (7) *-0.29 *-0.19 -0.14 0.07 *-0.24 0.12 0.08
Urban district (8) -0.06 *0.22 *0.24 *0.23 0.02 0.02 *0.18 -0.10
Rural district (9) 0.04 *-0.50 -0.16 *-0.18 -0.08 0.10 -0.16 *0.29 *-0.31
1992 (N=177)
DDS (1) *0.16
Total enrollment (thousand) (2) -0.03 *0.18
Black student rate (3) 0.07 0.08 -0.10
Current expenditure per pupil in $k (4) *0.70 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02
Poverty rate (5) *-0.30 *-0.28 -0.07 -0.10 *-0.20
At-risk student rate (6) *-0.31 -0.13 -0.10 -0.12 *-0.21 0.75
Percent of revenue from state (7) *-0.27 *-0.18 0.06 -0.14 *-0.40 *0.35 *0.38
Urban district (8) 0.00 0.11 *0.32 *-0.19 -0.04 *0.16 0.10 0.08
Rural district (9) *-0.28 *-0.47 -0.11 -0.02 *-0.17 *0.16 0.09 0.13 *-0.22
1990 (N=143)
DDS (1) *-0.34
Total enrollment (thousand) (2) 0.00 0.14
Black student rate (3) *-0.24 *0.27 0.14
Current expenditure per pupil in $k (4) *0.66 *-0.25 0.03 *-0.20
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Poverty rate (5) *-0.43 0.03 0.02 *0.32 *-0.29
At-risk student rate (6) *-0.29 0.11 0.08 0.55* *-0.30 *0.40
Percent of revenue from state (7) -0.12 0.09 -0.04 0.12 -0.05 *0.31 0.01
Urban district (8) -0.01 0.12 *0.34 0.14 0.08 0.02 0.08 -0.13
Rural district (9) *-0.24 -0.15 -0.13 0.05 *-0.17 *0.41 *0.17 *0.32 *-0.21
* p < 0.05
HLM Modeling Results
Unconditional models were tested with each year's data. Without any independent variables, the
models separately estimated the variance of the student math achievement at individual and district
levels. Table 4 presents the estimates of the unconditional models. For each year, a substantial
proportion of variance occurred at the district level, meaning that districts differed in their average
math achievement. For 1996, 26 percent of the variance was at the district level, as indicated by the
intraclass correlation coefficient. A chi-square statistic of 2401 with 159 degrees of freedom was
highly significant for the district variance estimate. The reliability of school means (0.71) was also
acceptable for further HLM analysis, as these sampled school means on average represented the
true school means reasonably well. (Note 3) The two-level variance distribution pattern was similar
in the 1992 and 1990 data. These statistics strongly suggested that HLM modeling with random
effect at the both levels was necessary for analyzing student achievement in relation to district fiscal
variables.
Table 4
Distribution of variance at the student and district levels: Unconditional models
with the 1996, 1992, and 1990 NAEP-CCD data
Estimates 1996 
NAEP-CCD
1992 
NAEP-CCD
1990 
NAEP-CCD
Fixed effect
Coefficient
Average district mean γ00
(standard error)
270.06
(1.47)
260.39
(1.66)
256.29
(1.65)
Random effect
District level variance u0j
df
245.00
159
373.39
176
262.38
143
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chi-square
p value
2401.18
0.000
2950.85
0.000
2950.49
0.000
Student level variance 
component rij
975.56 1160.06 681.59
Intraclass correlation rho 0.20 0.24 0.28
Reliability of the district mean
λj
0.71 0.78 0.71
District average math achievement in relation to DDR
Using district variables to explain district average math achievement, we tested a series of
means-as-outcomes models. At each level, the model specified a random effect. Fixed effects,
however, were only specified at the district level, including state average instructional spending
rate, DDR, total enrollment in thousands of students, Black student enrollment rate, CEPP in
$1000, child poverty rate, at-risk student rate, urban and rural locale (both coded in contrast to
suburban), and percent of revenue from the state. The resulting estimates are presented in Table 5.1.
Entering district-level independent variables in the model helped account for approximately a half
of the district-level variance (49 percent in 1996, 62 percent in 1992, and 53 percent in 1990).
Controlling for other variables, several district variables were found related to district average math
achievement in one or more years. District total enrollment was related to low average math
achievement in 1992, but not in 1990 and 1996. The minority enrollment rate was strongly related
to low average achievement in all three years, with high statistical significance. The child poverty
rate was related to low achievement mean, with a significant estimate for each year. These findings
were compatible with prior research in school organization and achievement.
The effect of DDR was not substantiated with data for the three years. Net of the effects of other
district variables, DDR was not statistically significantly related to district mean math achievement
in any year. The estimate in the three years was essentially zero since it was trivial in size and not
statistically significant. CEPP, on the other hand, was related to high average achievement,
although the estimate for 1992 was not statistically significant (see Table 5).
With the NAEP-CCD combined data for the three years, we failed to find evidence to support our
central hypothesis that high district instructional spending relative to the state average would
increase district average performance level, holding other things constant.
Table 5 
District average achievement and DDR and other district level
variables: Means-as-outcomes model (standard error in parentheses)
Estimates 1996a
NAEP-CCD
1992 
NAEP-CCD
1990 
NAEP-CCD
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Fixed effects
District mean  γ00 268.53 (1.18) 259.23 (1.19) 254.86 (1.28)
State average instructional spending
rate γ01
-0.21 (0.24) -0.19 (0.28) -0.64 (0.31)
District discretionary rate of
instructional spending (DDR) γ02
-0.21 (0.17) 0.42 (0.26) -0.20 (0.16)
Total enrollment in thousands γ03 -0.01 (0.02) *-0.03 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Minority enrollment rate γ04 **-0.45 (0.06) **-0.54 (0.07) **-0.36 (0.09)
CEPP $1000 γ05 **2.74 (1.06) 1.49 (1.13) **4.16 (1.59)
Child poverty rate γ07 *-0.21 (0.11) *-0.32 (0.14) **-0.59 (0.13)
Urban district γ08 -0.82 (3.82) -1.27 (3.01) 1.10 (3.50)
State revenue percentage γ010 -0.03 (0.05) *-0.16 (0.06) -0.09 (0.06)
Random effects
District mean u0j
125.21 150.41 121.57
chi-square 1303.42 1288.03 1420.38
District level variance explained 0.49 0.62 0.53
Student level variance 974.56 1158.68 671.91
* p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01
a
 A missing value flag was included in the model but not presented because its coefficient
was not statistically significant.
Joint effects between DDR and other district variables
Exploring the possible joint effects between fiscal and demographic variables at the
district level, we tested a number of interaction terms and presented selected estimates
from the model (see Table 6). We found no evidence of a joint effect between DDR and
the state contribution to the district revenue in relation to math achievement. The three
years' estimates were all trivial and not statistically significant. In other words, the state
funding for local districts and districts' autonomy in instructional spending did not jointly
influence achievement in some peculiar way as we might suspect.
Table 6
District average achievement accounted for by DDR and other
district-level variables and interaction terms: Means-as-outcomes
model (standard error in parentheses)
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Estimates 1996a
NAEP-CCD
1992 
NAEP-CCD
1990 
NAEP-CCD
Fixed effects
District mean γ00 268.72 (1.22) 259.17 (1.31) 254.95 (1.17)
State average instructional spending
rate γ01
-0.26 (0.23) -0.15 (0.27) -0.44 (0.30)
District discretionary rate of
instructional spending (DDR) γ02
*-1.03 (0.52) 0.87 (0.65) 0.41 (0.35)
Total enrollment in thousand γ03 -0.02 (0.01) *-0.03 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01)
Minority enrollment rate γ04 **-0.47 (0.06) **-0.53 (0.08) **-0.36 (0.10)
CEPP $1000 γ05 **2.89 (1.05) 1.57 (1.13) *3.72 (1.58)
Child poverty rate γ06 -0.10 (0.13) *-0.41 (0.16) **-0.58 (0.15)
State revenue percentage γ07 -0.02 (0.06) *-0.15 (0.06) -0.09 (0.06)
Urban district γ08 -1.64 (3.69) -0.11 (3.06) -0.27 (2.74)
Interaction terms
DDR x State revenue percentage γ09 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.00)
DDR x Urban γ010 -0.36 (0.51) 0.25 (0.63) **1.47 (0.41)
DDR x Child poverty γ011 *0.03 (0.01) -0.05 (0.03) -0.02 (0.01)
Randomeffects
District mean u0j
125.47 146.52 116.91
chi-square 1247.82 1306.15 1284.82
District level variance explained 0.49 0.64 0.55
Student level variance 974.18 1158.68 671.91
* p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01
a
 A missing value flag was included in the model but not presented because its coefficient
was not statistically significant.
The combined effect of DDR and urban locale seemed more complicated. It was
substantial and statistically significant with the 1990 data (the fixed effect estimate γ010 =
1.47 with p < 0.001), but virtually nil with the 1992 and 1996 data. The positive 1990
estimate implied that higher spending on instruction in a district (relative to the state
average) was related to higher average achievement for urban districts and the effect size
was fairly large. The finding, were it substantiated with multiple years' data, would offer
important policy implications.
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Another interaction term was between DDR and the child poverty rate, which also
resulted in inconsistent estimates across years. Only in 1996 was the estimate meaningful
(0.03 at p < 0.05 level), implying that, among high poverty districts, higher instructional
spending than the state average was related to slight better average math achievement; but
among low poverty districts, there was no such relationship. Again, this finding would be
potentially important should it be confirmed. It was not, however, substantiated with data
for 1992 and 1990. In fact, the effect disappeared even with the 1996 data in subsequent
analysis where additional variables were statistically controlled for (see Table 8.1).
Though the findings on combined effects between district discretionary instructional
spending were highly tentative, they posed questions for further studies.
Note that the DDR estimate, again, was trivial after the interaction terms entered into the
equation, except for 1996, when the estimate was significant at p < 0.05 level, modest,
and negative (- 1.03). This exception, as we see, should not change the overall finding
that DDR was largely unrelated to 8th graders' math achievement. On the other hand, net
of the additional interaction effects, CEPP estimate remained largely substantial and
significant for 1996 and 1990, indicating a positive relationship with math achievement.
The estimate was not statistically significant for 1992.
Math achievement gaps associated with sex, race/ethnicity, and SES
To examine the relationships of DDR to math achievement gaps associated with social
and demographic categories, it was necessary first to assess the magnitude of the gaps
and their variance; that is, how much the gaps varied across districts. We specified a
random-coefficient regression model wherein individual student sex, race/ethnicity, and
parental educational attainment were estimated as both fixed and random effects. The
estimates are presented in Table 7.
Table 7
Math achievement differences relating to sex race/ethnicity and
parents’ educational attainment: Random coefficient regression model
(standard error in parentheses)
Estimates 1996a
NAEP-CCD
1992 
NAEP-CCD
1990 
NAEP-CCD
Fixed effects coefficient
district mean  γ00 269.77 (1.46) 260.20 (1.65) 256.05 (1.62)
sex difference γ10 0.01 (1.26) 0.78 (1.26) 0.57 (1.30)
Race-ethnic difference γ20 **-23.33 (2.15) **-24.09 
(2.00)
**-20.16 
(1.90)
Parents' educational attainment
difference γ30
**16.75 (1.45) **15.38 (1.38) **17.89 (1.31)
Random effects
**256.42 **383.49 **267.97
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District mean  u0j
(df; chi-square)
(136; 2557.89) (153; 3106.93) (117; 2853.21)
sex difference u1j
(df; chi-square)
**82.69
(136; 212.05)
**80.35
(153; 220.76)
**91.67
(117; 195.57)
Race-ethnic difference u2j
(df; chi-square)
**168.08
(136; 202.07)
**191.28
(153; 233.29)
**105.77
(117; 238.53)
Parents’ educational attainment
difference u3j (df; chi-square) **69.07
(136; 219.91)
**44.75
(153; 210.52)
**68.04
(117; 227.77)
Student level variance 778.71 962.97 530.74
Correlation among district effects
District mean t00
Sex difference t11
Race/ethnicity difference t22
Parents’ education difference t33
t00        t11      
t22
1.00
-0.22
  0.25 -0.14
  0.16 -0.18
0.44
t00        t11      
t22
1.00
-0.01
-0.17 -0.33
0.21 -0.29 0.23
t00        t11      
t22
1.00
-0.03
0.02 -0.03
0.11 -0.22 
-0.11
Reliability of regression coefficient estimates
District mean 0.73 0.79 0.71
Sex difference 0.31 0.33 0.34
Race/ethnic difference 0.31 0.32 0.25
Parents’ education difference 0.26 0.23 0.28
* p < 0.05  ** p < 0.01
a
 A missing value flag was included in the model but not presented because its coefficient
was not statistically significant.
There was no evidence from each year's data that 8th grade math achievement differed by
sex within districts as the fixed effect coefficient was close to zero and was not
statistically significant. However, the random variation associated with sex was
substantial and statistically significant across the three years (e.g., for 1996 u1j = 82.69, 
df = 136, c2 = 212.05), suggesting that sex difference in achievement varied considerably
across districts around a mean of zero. This situation was similar to findings from some
earlier studies (e.g., Raudenbush, Kidchanapanish, & Kang 1991). Not only the
magnitude of the gap, but also the direction of the association, could differ across
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districts. It is possible to sort out factors that were responsible for the variance in future
analysis. However, limited by the scope of this study, we did not include sex as an
achievement gap in the subsequent modeling.
Race/ethnicity was clearly a strong predictor of math achievement for all three years. The
fixed effect estimate γ20 was large (-23.33 for 1996, -24.09 for 1992, and —20.16 for
1990) and highly significant (p < 0.001 each year), confirming that minority students
(other than Asian American) on average tended to achieve low on the NAEP math test
within districts. The random effect for race/ethnicity was substantial and significant,
revealing that districts differed in the racial/ethnic gap and that the variance needed
further explanation.
As a socioeconomic status indicator, parents' educational attainment was specified in the
model. The fixed effect estimate γ30 was positive and large for each year (16.75, 15.38,
and 17.89 respectively for 1996, 1992, and 1990, all significant at p < 0.01 level). The
estimate suggested that within districts, on average, students whose parents had college or
more education performed better on the NAEP math test. The estimate of the random
effect was also substantial and highly significant over the years, revealing that districts
differed in the math achievement gap associated with family social background.
Obviously, the varying achievement gap relating to parents' education merited further
modeling.
Because of the specified student-level variables in the model, student-level variance
became considerably small relative to the estimates from the prior means-as-outcomes
model (778.71, 962.97 and 530.74 in Table 7, compared with the 974.56, 1158.68, and
681.08 shown in Table 5, respectively, for the three years).
The covariance matrixes generated from the model with the three years' data provided
information about the correlation between district-level residual random effects (Table 7,
panel 3). One of the consistent findings for all the years was that the district average
achievement residual variance positively and moderately related to the residual variance
of parents' education-associated achievement gap (0.16, 0.21, and 0.11). This finding
implied that, holding other things constant, the higher the district average math test
scores, the wider the district-level achievement gap between students whose parents had
higher education and students whose parents did not. Another consistent estimate was the
correlation between sex gap and parents' education gap (-0.18, -0.29, and —0.22 for the
three years). These estimates suggested that, to some modest extent, the wider a district's
sex difference in math achievement, the smaller the district's math achievement gap
relating to parents' education. The remaining estimates of correlation changed
substantially across years and it was impossible to interpret them without further analysis.
A final note for the random coefficient model: For each year, while the reliability of the
intercept (district average math achievement) was reasonably high, the reliability
measures for slopes (differences associated with sex, race/ethnicity, and parental
education) were fairly low. This finding pointed to a frequently encountered problem in
HLM analysis of survey data; that is, the difficulty to model the slopes (see Bryk &
Raudenbush, 1992, pp. 102—103). Additional analysis was needed to sort out whether
the lower reliability for slope statistics was due to the NAEP data collection design, small
within-district sample, real differences across districts in the statistics, or simply the error
variance in the slope estimation.
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Final model
To control for variables at the student and district levels in examining the relationships of
DDR and achievement, we integrated the previous modeling into a full HLM model, with
both means and slopes as outcomes in the regression analysis. The resulting estimates of
fixed effects and random effects are presented separately in Tables 8.1 and 8.2. The
findings were consistent with those discussed earlier. Accounting for district's average
math achievement, we did not observe any effect by DDR. However, CEPP and a number
of district factors did relate to the achievement mean, as interpreted below.
Table 8-1
District mean, racial/ethnic gap, and SES gap in achievement accounted
for by DDR and other district variables: Fixed effects (standard error
in parentheses)
Estimates 1996 
NEAP-CCDa
1992 
NAEP-CCD
1990 
NAEP-CCD
District average mean γ00 268.64 (1.15) 259.12 (1.17) 254.89 (1.22)
State average instructional
spending rate γ01 -0.27 (0.23) -0.16 (0.27) -0.44 (0.30)
Total enrollment in thousand
γ02 -0.01 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02) -0.02 (0.01)
Minority enrollment rate γ03 -0.47 **(0.06) -0.53 **(0.08) -0.36 **(0.10)
CEPP in $K γ04 2.85 **(1.07) 1.60 (1.14) 3.69 *(1.56)
Child poverty rate γ05 -0.09 (0.13) -0.40 *(0.17) -0.58 **(0.15)
Percent of revenue from state
γ06 -0.03 (0.06) -0.17 **(0.06) -0.09 (0.06)
Urban locale γ07 -1.97 (3.61) -0.27 (3.02) -0.54 (2.79)
DDR γ08 -1.02 (0.52) 0.52 (0.64) 0.38 (0.35)
DDR*urban γ09 -0.36 (0.49) 0.20 (0.64) 1.48 **(0.43)
DDR*state revenue percentage
γ010 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
DDR*poverty rate γ011 0.03 (0.02) -0.05 (0.03) -0.02 (0.02)
Race/ethnicity gap γ10 -23.64 **(1.76) -24.35 **(1.68) -21.55 **(1.59)
Average state instructional
spending rate γ11 0.52 (0.38) 0.56 (0.37) -0.24 (0.55)
Total enrollment in thousands
γ12 0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.03 *(0.01)
Minority enrollment rate γ13 -0.13 (0.10) -0.07 (0.11) 0.01 (0.15)
CEPP in $K γ14 0.71 (1.74) 0.99 (2.28) 4.08 (2.47)
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Child poverty rate γ15 0.04 (0.18) 0.38 *(0.17) -0.08 (0.23)
Urban locale γ16 0.57 (3.53) -4.08 (3.91) -7.37 (4.39)
DDR γ17 0.13 (0.40) -0.16 (0.54) 0.43 (0.36)
SES (parent education) gap γ20 15.95 **(1.22) 14.81 **(1.15) 17.13 **(1.12)
Average state instructional
spending rate γ21 -0.24 (0.25) 0.00 (0.21) -0.05 (0.32)
Total enrollment in thousands
γ22 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.02) 0.01 (0.01)
Minority enrollment rate γ23 -0.08 (0.06) -0.05 (0.05) -0.07 (0.09)
CEPP in $K γ24 0.35 (1.04) 1.63 (1.14) -0.47 (1.70)
Child poverty rate γ25 -0.31 **(0.12) -0.10 (0.09) -0.03 (0.15)
Urban locale γ26 -1.18 (2.76) 0.46 (2.60) -1.03 (2.27)
DDR γ27 -0.42 (0.25) -0.01 (0.21) 0.00 (0.18)
* p < 0.05  ** p< 0.01
a
 A missing value flag was included in the model but not presented because its coefficient
was not statistically significant.
Table 8-2
District mean, racial-ethnic gap, and SES gap in achievement
accounted for by DDR and other district variables: Random effects
(standard error in parentheses)
Estimates
1996a
NAEP-CCD
1992
NAEP-CCD
1990
NAEP-CCD
Random effects
District mean  u0j
df
chi-square
variance explained:
relative to means-as-outcomes- model
relative to random coefficient regression 
model
132.18
125
1325.27
-0.05b
0.48
151.91
142
1341.32
b
-0.03
0.61
119.94
105
1259.89
b
-0.02
0.55
Racial/ethnic gap u1j
chi-square
152.28
187.61
165.78
212.61
81.67
209.58
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variance explained:
relative to random coefficient regression 
model 0.10 0.14 0.23
SES gap u1j
chi-square
variance explained:
relative to random coefficient regression 
model
60.80
204.70
0.13
42.14
199.03
0.05
64.82
206.78
0.06
Student level variance 804.03 988.08 545.27
* p < 0.05  ** p< 0.01
a
 A missing value flag was included in the model but not presented because its coefficient
was not statistically significant.
b
 The estimate implies that the final model accounted for a smaller portion of the
variance of this variable.
Fixed effects: The fixed effect estimate for DDR in 1996 was γ08 = -1.02, not statistically 
significant (p = 0.051, see Table 8.1). The other years' estimates were close to zero and
statistically insignificant as well. This finding, again, showed no evidence that district
discretionary instructional spending relative to the state average spending would lead to
higher average math achievement.
The minority enrollment rate was a consistently strong negative predictor of districts'
mean math achievement, with estimates of -0.47, -0.53, and -0.36 for the three years, all
highly significant. CEPP was quite consistently estimated as a positive predictor of
district achievement level, with estimates of 2.85 in 1996, 1.60 in 1992, and 3.69 in 1990,
and statistically significant in 1996 and 1990. The child poverty rate was another
predictor with fairly consistent estimates over the years (-0.09 for 1996, -0.40 for 1992,
and -0.58 for 1990), and the statistic was significant in 1992 and 1990. Note that the
state's share of revenue for the district yielded a statistically significant estimate only for
1992 (-0.17, p < 0.01). This suggested that holding other conditions constant, districts
that received a higher portion of state contribution tended to achieve somewhat lower in
the NAEP test in that year, probably due to the fact that states' contribution was typically
prioritized for low-achieving local schools.
Estimates of interaction effects from the full model confirmed those from the previous
modeling. For one, the interaction between DDR and urban locale was quite strong and
statistically significant for 1990 (1.48, at p < 0.01 level). DDR seemed to connect to the
somewhat higher average math score of urban districts relative to districts in suburban or
rural areas. The 1996 and 1992 data, however, failed to produce consistent estimates and
therefore this finding is tentative as well. We note that the estimate for the DDR-poverty
interaction effect was no longer found to be different from zero for 1996 data with the
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full model.
Gaps associated with race/ethnicity and parents' education were substantiated with the
full model. Controlling for both within and between district variables, both race/ethnicity
and parents' education had sizable fixed effect on mean achievement across the three
years. For race/ethnicity, the estimate was -23.64 in 1996, -24.35 in 1992, and -21.55 in
1990, significant at p < 0.01 level. Two variables showed some unstable effect on the
gap, but only for one year. One was district total enrollment, related to a trivially
narrowed gap (-0.03 at p < 0.05 level) for 1990. The child poverty rate, on the other hand,
related to a smaller racial gap (0.38 at p < 0.05 level) for 1992, suggesting that in districts
of high poverty, minority students' achievement was slightly closer to White and Asian
students' than it was in districts of low poverty. Again, without across-year consistent
estimates, this interpretation requires additional analyses to confirm.
Accounting for the gap associated with SES as indicated by parents' educational
attainment, none of the fixed estimates were statistically significant, except that of the
child poverty rate
(-0.31 at p < 0.01 level) estimated with 1996 data. This effect may be interpreted in a
similar way to that for the poverty rate and race/ethnicity gap. It may imply that for
students who attended high poverty districts, parents' education made a smaller difference
in their math achievement than it did for students in other districts. Poverty at the district
level thus seemed to "dampen" the racial and socioeconomic differences at the student
level. We may speculate that this finding perhaps hints of narrow ranges of both student
background measures and achievement measures in a high poverty district. In other
words, poverty-related social homogeneity might underlie the reduced achievement gaps.
Without consistent results across years, such a "dampening" hypothesis about
district-level poverty on the individual achievement gaps awaits additional analysis to
substantiate.
Random effects:
The final model's goodness of fit estimates were quite comparable for the three years (see
Table 8.2). In general, the model has been improved in regard to accounting for the slope
but not for the district mean. For example, between-district variance as estimated in the
final model was actually smaller than it was estimated in the means-as-the-outcome
model (see Table 6), which contained the same district-level variables as did the final
model. This pattern, similar across the three years, may suggest that the multiple predictor
variables of slopes caused the model to fit less well as most added variables were not
related to the slopes as expected. Nevertheless, the variance of the two slopes was
substantially reduced. Relative to the random-coefficient regression model which
contained only random effect for the slopes, the final estimates showed that the slope
equations fit better.
Conclusions
Our findings did not support the hypothesis that drove this study, namely, that local
districts could improve academic performance by increasing instructional spending. Net
of district factors known to affect student achievement, school district discretionary
spending in instruction, defined as the difference between the district instructional
spending rate and the average instructional spending rate in a state, did not relate to a
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district's 8th grade average math performance. The null effect was consistent in the
analysis of the combined NAEP-CCD data for 1990, 1992, and 1996. On the other hand,
fairly consistently, the analysis has found that some district characteristics were related to
average achievement. Specifically, other conditions being equal, a district's current
expenditure per pupil (CEPP) was found related to higher math performance in a modest
yet consistent way. Demographic attributes at the district level, including the minority
student enrollment rate and the child poverty rate, were strongly related to lower math
achievement, net of other effects.
The finding of the null effect of local districts' control over instructional spending as
indicated by DDR may lead to different directions for future research on the district role
in reform. First, considering the complex procedures of local decisionmaking on
educational financing, research needs to deepen the inquiry about districts' fiscal
policymaking, especially the changing patterns of instructional spending in connection to
other capital outlays and revenue. Variation in instructional spending might reflect
distinctive school conditions and policy concerns other than academic performance. For
example, new technologies and equipment often demand a large budget for upgrading
and staff training; school security is a pressing issue calling for increasing funding in
some areas; aging buildings incur extremely high costs to renovate. Many continuing or
lump sum expenditures may cause instructional spending to fluctuate considerably, which
may or may not have an immediate impact on academic test results. On the revenue side,
federal or state funding and related requirements may vary depending on changes in the
government and the legislation as well as economic conditions in a larger context.
Investigators must consider specific motives underlying decisions on spending and the
broad conditions leading to such motives, together with DDR in order to understand local
fiscal policymaking in relation to academic performance.
The finding that CEPP was positively related to math achievement leads to questions
about the value of instructional spending as a key indicator of district fiscal control in
explaining student achievement. Instructional spending is probably a concept too narrow
to capture the complexities involved in a district's fiscal decisionmaking. In contrast,
current spending adjusted to student enrollment could be more predictive of student
performance as it appears encompassing such issues as diverse district and community
context and various needs for funding. Therefore, future research may test alternative
indicators of district fiscal policy control in connection to student academic performance
and other outcomes. CEPP definitely should be a useful candidate for such research.
Furthermore, we recognize that the district has limited instructional spending control as
the range of DDR was quite narrow (over the years, approximately 20 percent below or
above the state average, see Tables 2.1—2.3). Such control may have little
impact—relative to district policymaking in other respects—on student achievement.
Hence, we may want to shift research attention to other aspects of district policymaking
and operation. For example, research may focus on district differences in handling
curriculum and instructional standard development; teacher recruitment, training,
participation in decisionmaking, and accountability; community involvement and
support; effectiveness in managing technological upgrading, school and class size,
facilities maintenance, student services, and other administrative roles.
This analysis did offer some interesting albeit unsettled clues for learning about how
district discretionary instructional spending might function jointly with other variables to
influence achievement. The 1990 data showed that high DDR in urban districts was
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related to substantially higher average math performance, although the relationship was
not evident in analysis of the 1996 and 1992 data. On the other hand, with the 1996 data,
higher DDR in poor districts appeared to relate to slightly higher math achievement than
it did in other districts. Limited reliability of the reweighted NAEP-CCD data is a likely
culprit for the inconsistence. But unknown or shifting circumstances wherein
instructional spending interacted with local conditions may also have contributed to such
inconsistent patterns. It may be promising to expand the research to conceptualize and
examine such joint effects between local instructional spending and local conditions. It is
possible that, with more reliable data and precise measures, future inquiries could identify
this sort of "equalizing" effect on district instructional spending.
Another intriguing yet uncertain issue that emerged in the analysis was sex difference in
math achievement. Within districts, sex difference in 8th grade math achievement was
estimated to be virtually zero with the three years' data. But between districts, the
variance of sex effect was estimated high and statistically significant for all of the three
years. Factors at the institution level—including school and district—should be part of
the explanation. However, classroom instructional practice and other organizational
environmental influences are probably more salient relative to fiscal policy in explaining
the between-district variance of sex difference. Again, this question awaits future
investigation.
Combining NAEP and CCD data into a synthetic analysis proved to be a challenging
task. A series of difficulties emerged in the process of data merging and data editing
because of changes over the years in both data collections (for a detailed discussion, see
the Technical Report). In addition to addressing technical problems, future research
would call for re-conceptualizing district fiscal management processes, examining
district-state interaction regarding education financing, pinpointing joint effects of fiscal
policymaking and local/regional conditions, and improving the reliability of the
measurement and data quality of district fiscal status.
Specifically, it may be fruitful to separately study individual states and to integrate the
findings onto the national level. This approach would require using data from NAEP
State Tests and CCD for individual state analyses in a much more extensive scale than
that attempted in the current analysis. It would also entail thoughtful interpretation and
reconciliation of the possibly incongruent findings from the state analyses to generate
cogent narratives about education financing at the state and district levels. Such narratives
would probably involve in-depth qualitative analyses with information sources other than
the survey data. A study of this sort would be a large-scale, challenging undertaking. But
it appears more likely to produce comprehensive and in-depth knowledge about the local
district's role in performance-driven reform, particularly its fiscal control in connection to
student achievement.
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Notes
1. In fact, the two studies came up with quite inconsistent results regarding the
relationship between central administration per pupil expenditure and math achievement.
The aggregated study indicated a positive strong relationship between the two variables
(Wenglinsky 1997 pp. 230—231). The HLM study found no relation at all between the
two measures; rather it found per pupil instructional expenditure to be associated with a
smaller socioeconomic status (SES)-related achievement gap (Wenglinsky 1998 p. 276).
Such inconclusive results call for further research to clarify both the methodological and
the substantive issues involved in synthetic analysis of NAEP and CCD data.
2. However, recognizing that rural conditions differ from urban districts, we plan to
specifically examine the rural-urban difference in district spending patterns and
achievement during another project.
3. With the original NAEP data, the reliability for school means is substantially higher,
around 0.90 for the three years. The lower reliability was apparently a result of sample
modification.
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Appendix I
  Modification of the Sample and Weights
Appendix I is available for downloading as a Rich Text Formatted file.
Appendix II
  Race-Census Region with Modified Sample
NAEP-CCD 1990 
Frequencies of students by region-race using sum of Level-1 weight             10
Based on original weight (ORIGWT) in NAEP data
Race-Region Freq. % Cum. Freq. Cu. %
            White-Northeast 877022.5 12.37       877022.5 12.37
            White-Midwest 1501565 21.18       2378587 33.55
            White-South 1975736 27.87        4354323 61.42
            White-West 600752.9 8.47        4955076 69.89
            Non-hispanic black 1147326 16.18        6102402 86.08
            Hispanic 771106 10.88        6873508 96.95
            Non-hispanic other 216087.6 3.05        7089596 100.00
         Frequencies of students by region-race using sum of Level-1 weight             11 
    Based on adjusted weight (ADJWT) for merged NAEP-CCD data
 
Race-Region Freq. % Cum. Freq. Cu. %
            White-Northeast 959336.4 13.53       959336.4 13.53
            White-Midwest 1393679   19.66        2353015 33.19
            White-South 1501023 21.17        3854038 54.36
            White-West 964005.8 13.60        4818044 67.96
            Non-hispanic black 1137725 16.05        5955769 84.01
            Hispanic 838602.6 11.83       6794371 95.84
            Non-hispanic other 295224.5 4.16       7089596 100.00
NAEP-CCD 1992 
         Frequencies of students by region-race using sum of Level-1 weight             19 
Based on original weight (ORIGWT) in NAEP data
Race-Region Freq. % Cum. Freq. Cu. %
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            White-Northeast 454207.7 11.27      454207.7 11.27
            White-Midwest 766619.7 19.01        1220827 30.28
            White-South 982156.5 24.36        2202984 54.64
             White-West 523640.3 12.99       2726624 67.63
            Non-hispanic black 711623.6 17.65        3438248 85.28
            Hispanic 432971.2 10.74        3871219 96.02
            Non-hispanic other 160653 3.98        4031872 100.00
         Frequencies of students by region-race using sum of Level-1 weight             20 
  Based on adjusted weight (ADJWT) for merged NAEP-CCD data
Race-Region Freq. % Cum. Freq. Cu. %
   White-Northeast 446802.1 11.15       446802.1    11.15
White-Midwest 753990.9 18.81       1200793 29.96
White-South 965832.3 24.10       2166625 54.05
White-West 515042 12.85        2681667 66.90
Non-hispanic black 635054.6 15.84        3316722 82.75
Hispanic 505862.2 12.62        3822584        95.37
  Non-hispanic other 185603.8   4.63       4008188 100.00
NAEP-CCD 1996 
         Frequencies of students by region-race using sum of Level-1 weight             14 
  Based on original weight (ORIGWT) in NAEP data
Race-Region Freq. % Cum. Freq. Cu. %
   White-Northeast 402880.7 12.65       402880.7 12.65
  White-Midwest 615135.1 19.31       1018016 31.95
White-South 705724 22.15        1723740 54.11
White-West 437100.6 13.72        2160840 67.82
Non-hispanic black 477674.1 14.99        2638514 82.82
Hispanic 402241.1 12.63        3040756 95.44
Non-hispanic other 145152.3 4.56        3185908 100.00
         Frequencies of students by region-race using sum of Level-1 weight             15  
  Based on adjusted weight (ADJWT) for merged NAEP-CCD data
Race-Region Freq. % Cum. Freq. Cu. %
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            White-Northeast 389907.8 12.24      389907.8  12.24
            White-Midwest   598667.2  18.79      988575.1 31.03
            White-South 684636.9 21.49       1673212   52.52
            White-West 387357.9 12.16       2060570 64.68
            Non-hispanic black 538638.3 16.91        2599208 81.58
            Hispanic 432200.4 13.57       3031409 95.15
            Non-hispanic other 154499.4 4.85  100
Appendix III
Analytic procedures with two-level HLM modeling
Appendix III is available for downloading as a Rich Text Formatted file.
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